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UPSTAIRS, DOWNSTAIRS:
SUBNATIONAL INCORPORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AT THE
END OF AN ERA
Martha F. Davis*
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, the Public Broadcasting System imported Upstairs,
Downstairs, a long-running miniseries from Great Britain. Encompassing
the years from 1903 through the end of World War I, the series was set in
the elegant five-story London townhouse occupied by Lord and Lady
Bellamy and their two teenage children. Lord Bellamy was active in
national affairs and served as a member of Parliament. The series might
have been built around the challenges confronting the nation qua nation-
the economic and social turmoil at the turn of the century, the growing
emancipation of women, the foreign relations between Germany and
Britain-and their impact on the Bellamy family. However, instead of
focusing exclusively on the upstairs family, the series gave equal time to the
downstairs family, the Bellamys' servants. Though less visible to the
outside world, the downstairs family-butlers, maids, cooks, and other
domestic employees-maintained highly complex and intertwined
horizontal as well as (literally) vertical relationships with the Bellamys. Of
course, like the Bellamys, the downstairs family also maintained complex
relationships outside of the household and were themselves also influenced
by current events. In the popular series, the downstairs servants and the
upstairs nobles may have performed different functions within the
household, but their capacities were not limited or defined by those
functions.'
The final episode of the series ended in 1930 with the Bellamys'
townhouse being sold to pay off the upstairs family's creditors. Series fans
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Program on Human Rights and the Global Economy,
Northeastern University School of Law; Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program, Harvard
Law School (2008-2009). Thanks to Elizabeth Persinger, Bardia Esghi, Kyle Courtney,
Cindy Soohoo, Cathy Albisa, Richard Ratner, and Rick Doyon for critical assistance.
1. A twenty-first-century remake of Upstairs, Downstairs might illustrate this point
even more dramatically. A few years ago, I hired a woman to clean my home every few
weeks. After I got to know her, she cheerfully informed me that she was simultaneously
running a real estate business from my house, using her cell phone to conduct her business
while she cleaned.
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pleaded with the producer to develop just one more year of the series,
taking the Bellamys and their downstairs counterparts into a new decade,
but he declined.2 By 1930, vertical households such as the Bellamys' were
increasingly rare. Increased access to education, greater mobility between
classes and, in the late 1930s, the labor needs dictated by World War II
contributed to the demise of the Upstairs, Downstairs era.3  More
availability of affordable housing also spurred the social and economic
independence of servants who had once lived in the homes of their
employers but could now afford their own homes. Continuing the series,
the producer concluded, would have perpetuated a historical anachronism. 4
This essay offers Upstairs, Downstairs as a simple metaphor for the
current evolving relationship between U.S. federal and state jurisdictions
when it comes to international human rights law. Though international law
is typically viewed as of federal (upstairs) concern, the states and localities
downstairs operate in the same world, receive the same information, react to
the same influences and constituencies, and develop their own responses
that are not always limited by the formal construction of local and state
governments' roles within our federal system.5 This essay focuses on one
example of this phenomenon: the growing list of state and local laws that
reflect the influence of international human rights norms.6
Importantly, the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government have often endorsed and encouraged state and local
implementation of these international norms. At the same time, in two
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
2. Upstairs, Downstairs, Season Five, http://updown.org.uk/epguide/s5.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008).
3. ALAN EREIRA, THE PEOPLE'S ENGLAND 67 (1981); Ross MCKIBBIN, CLASSES AND
CULTURES: ENGLAND 1918-1951, at 109 (1998). See generally Carol Dyhouse, Family
Patterns of Social Mobility Through Higher Education in England in the 1930s, 34 J. Soc.
HIST. 817 (2001).
4. Upstairs, Downstairs, Season Five, http://updown.org.uk/epguide/s5.htm (last visited
Oct. 21, 2008); Posting of JudyT to Everything2, http://everything2.com
/e2node/Upstairs%252C%2520Downstairs (May 28, 2005, 13:18:38).
5. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local
Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors
(TOGAs), 50 ARIz. L. REv. 709, 711-12 (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 711-12, on file
with the Fordham Law Review); see also Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S.
Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REv. 647,
648 (2007) ("[Sltate and local governments today have become deeply enmeshed in
international affairs as globalization has decentralized foreign relations.").
6. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "[h]uman rights are
international norms that help to protect all people everywhere from severe political, legal,
and social abuses .... These rights exist in morality and in law at the national and
international levels." James Nickel, Human Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (July 29, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human. The principal
sources of contemporary human rights are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the many widely accepted human rights documents and treaties that build on the Universal
Declaration, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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Council7 and American Insurance Ass 'n v. Garamendi,8 and one lower
court decision, National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias,9 the federal
courts have vigorously policed the boundaries of states' roles in
international affairs, using the federal preemption doctrine to limit states'
authority to adopt policies that are intended to promote human rights
practices abroad.
The U.S. Supreme Court faced a somewhat different issue implicating
states' compliance with human rights standards in Medellin v. Texas.10
There, it was the State of Texas that defied international human rights
norms embodied in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and
interpreted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while the federal
executive branch attempted (through an official President's Memorandum)
to require compliance. 11  The Court rejected the Administration's
position. 12 Instead, the Court concluded that, like most treaties ratified by
the United States, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is not self-
executing.' 3 Therefore, in the absence of a specific congressional mandate,
the State of Texas retained the discretion to ignore human rights norms,
even though its position had a negative impact on U.S. foreign relations by
undermining the nation's ability to promise adherence to international
treaties. 14
From a bird's eye perspective, the opinions in this series of cases focus
on the strength of the federal foreign policy interests involved, as ultimately
expressed by the Executive, as compared to the strength of the state interest
in regulating the area at issue. However, looking at these cases as a power
struggle between the federal and state governments loses sight of what the
states challenged in these cases were actually trying to accomplish through
their actions. The underlying facts and result in Medellin, alongside the
facts and law of Crosby, Giannoulias, and particularly Garamendi, create
an odd asymmetry in the treatment of subnational incorporation of
international human rights norms. On the one hand, Garamendi indicates
that executive action in the foreign affairs arena may be sufficient to restrict
subnational governments from taking action to promote human rights
because of possible tensions between state and federal policies that are
7. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
8. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
9. 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (2007).
10. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
11. Id. at 1352-53.
12. Id. at 1373.
13. Id. at 1357.
14. Indeed, in the wake of the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), Mexico filed a request for interpretation of the
court's prior judgment in Avena with the International Court of Justice, charging that the
United States was attempting to avoid its obligations under the Vienna Convention. See
Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Mexico Files a Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America) and Asks for the Urgent Indication of Provisional
Measures (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14578.pdf.
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nevertheless not in direct conflict. On the other hand, Medellin instructs
that executive action alone is not sufficient to prevent subnational
governments from undermining human rights norms, even when the states'
positions are in direct conflict with federal foreign policy and are actually
interfering with foreign relations.
There is nothing inherently wrong with asymmetry in the law. 15 But
symmetry generally is the starting point.16  For example, rights are
generally accompanied by obligations absent some special justification. A
similar balance is achieved through our federal system, where the
complimentary areas of authority of federal and state sovereigns create a
system of checks that results in better government on both the federal and
state levels.17 The asymmetry in the treatment of subnational human rights
implementation is one that not only upsets that balance between federal and
state governments, but has the effect of discouraging implementation of
universal human rights on the subnational level. Particularly when the
human rights norms at issue are ones that have been widely adopted
internationally, and even endorsed by the U.S. federal government, a
departure from the norm of legal symmetry should require some heightened
justification.
This essay examines the legal asymmetry underscored and clarified in
Garamendi and Medellin, and argues that it is a relic of the Upstairs,
Downstairs era of federal-state relations, when only the federal government
was expected to have a public face in the international arena. 18 To some
extent, this attitude was dictated by international law itself, which formally
focuses on nation-states. 19  Perhaps in an earlier era, with limited
information flow to the states and less global expertise residing in state
governments, such complete federal dominance in the area had more
justification. Yet, as with the Upstairs, Downstairs metaphor, the notion
that servants, or subnational governments, had no independent horizontal
relationships was always a myth. The idea of a nation speaking with "one
voice" on all things foreign, while a critical component of jurisprudence in
this area, was never strictly true. Subnational activity on the international
stage goes back centuries, to the earliest days of the United States. 20
15. However, asymmetry is in tension with the human ideal and therefore much-studied.
See, e.g., CHRIS MCMANuS, RIGHT HAND, LEFT HAND: THE ORIGINS OF ASYMMETRY IN
BRAINS, BODIES, ATOMS AND CULTURES 353 (2002).
16. For a thorough review of the ways in which symmetry is used in legal rhetoric and
reasoning, see Karen Petroski, The Rhetoric of Symmetry, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1165 (2007).
17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 365-70 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson
ed., 1865); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 & n.14
(1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for
a Third Century, 88 COLUM, L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936);
GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 30-36 (1919).
19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
ch. 1, introductory note (1987).
20. Subnational governments have been engaged in internationally focused activities
throughout U.S. history. One early example is South Carolina's support for the British in the
[Vol.'77
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Today, international legal institutions increasingly address subnational
actors that are more and more active in the global arena.21
Bringing U.S. law into line with these realities requires another look at
the doctrine of federal preemption in those instances where subnational
governments act to promote widely accepted human rights norms. This
adjustment does not require a constitutional amendment or overruling of
Supreme Court precedent. As Judith Resnik has noted, through careful
opinions, the courts have continued to reserve some space for states and
localities to implement human rights norms.22 An affirmative statement
expressing the scope of subnational authority would clarify the law, rather
than change it.
This essay proceeds as follows. First, it reviews state and local human
rights legislation enacted by subnational governments in recent years.
Importantly, a review of these laws reveals that few, if any, are exclusively
inward-looking or exclusively outward-looking. Most reflect the current
complexity of subnational relationships, combining local concerns with a
keen awareness of the international context in which subnational actions
take place. Second, this essay examines recent case law on federal
preemption of subnational human rights initiatives, comparing the approach
in these cases with the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Medellin, which
recognizes limitations on the executive branch's ability to impose human
rights standards on states. Reviewing these doctrines immediately after
cataloging subnational human rights efforts provides a strong reality check,
making clear that the judicial doctrine of preemption is a blunt instrument
Franco-British War, in which the federal government had proclaimed U.S. neutrality. See
Martha F. Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: States, Municipalities, and
International Human Rights, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO
HUMAN RIGHTS 127, 128 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
21. See generally Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics: The
Implications of Massachusetts' "Burma Law," 115 POL. SCI. Q. 353, 371-72 (2000); Resnik
et al., supra note 5. Indeed, the concluding observations and recommendations issued by the
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination addressed
subnational governments in a number of places. For example, in paragraph 9 the Committee
noted "with satisfaction" the California Housing Element Law of 1969 as a model statute,
and in paragraph 13, noted "with concern" the "lack of appropriate and effective
mechanisms to ensure a co-ordinated approach towards the implementation of the
Convention at the federal, state and local levels." U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the
Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 9, 13, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008). Among the reports
offered to the Committee during its review process were local critiques of Milwaukee,
Chicago, New York City, and Minnesota's compliance with the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). See U.S. HUMAN RiGHTS
NETWORK, ICERD SHADOW REPORT 2008 §§ 24-26, 28 (2008), available at
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/cerd-shadow_2008.
22. Resnik et al., supra note 5, at 780-83; see, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346,
1374 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that "sometimes States must shoulder the
primary responsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation" by complying
with international treaty standards). Notably, while Justice John Paul Stevens's concurrence
was not necessary to the majority, the majority opinion did not take issue with Justice
Stevens's gloss on the Court's opinion. See id. at 1358-59 & n.5.
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that may undermine important local human rights efforts even where there
are no actual conflicts with federal approaches or imminent foreign policy
concerns. Indeed, Crosby and Garamendi rest on the questionable
assumption that the judiciary can distinguish between subnational acts that
are purely local and those with implications for foreign affairs. Finally, this
essay concludes that the decision in Medellin-which defers to state
criminal procedure rules in the absence of overriding federal legislation,
even if the state's approach undermines human rights norms-points the
way to a more balanced approach to the issue of subnational human rights
implementation. This essay argues that, as a counterweight to the Medellin
approach, subnational governments should also be allowed to promote
accepted human rights norms absent specific federal legislative or executive
action to the contrary, and it proposes touchstones for the implementation
of such an approach.
I. SUBNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES
As awareness of human rights standards and norms grows within the
United States, states and localities have increasingly taken formal action to
promote human rights.23 In doing so, they draw on a rich body of codified
human rights law, including human rights declarations like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and human rights treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as
interpretations of these instruments issued by human rights bodies such as
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. 24 Many of these formal
human rights documents have been embraced by the United States.25 Even
those instruments that are not ratified by the United States often reflect
American participation and influence. 26 Indeed, the human rights concepts
that subnational governments embrace are not at all foreign-they can be
traced back to the origins of the United States.27 In more recent times, a
series of formal legal instruments of human rights were developed in the
23. See Davis, supra note 20, at 134-43.
24. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 66(3) (2004). The Massachusetts law cites the
Beijing Platform for Action, which incorporates the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the United Nations Charter, among
other U.N. documents. Id.; see also Davis, supra note 20, at 145-46 (discussing Universal
Declaration of Human Rights); id. at 146-47 (describing efforts to implement ICCPR in San
Francisco).
25. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2004)
[hereinafter Status of Ratifications], available at http://unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
26. For example, the United States actively participated in the drafting of CEDAW.
See, e.g., LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRtIPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN 37, 46, 53 (1993). However, the United States has never ratified the treaty. See
Status of Ratifications, supra note 25.
27. See generally Paul Gordon Lauren, A Human Rights Lens on U.S. History: Human
Rights at Home and Human Rights Abroad, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A
HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
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wake of World War II, in a concerted international effort to avoid a repeat
of the atrocities and human rights abuses of Nazi Germany.
28
Given the origins of the modem human rights movement, much has been
written about the moral weight of human rights. 29 Human rights are often
characterized as a version of natural law, which is tightly bound to moral
theory about the worth of individuals. 30  While the unadulterated
"goodness" of human rights is certainly contested,31 it is fair to say that a
subnational government (or a national government, for that matter) that
enacts human rights legislation can claim a moral high ground.
Adoption of human rights norms may also be a component of good
government. In addition to the moral force of human rights norms, there is
considerable literature quantifying the positive effects of human rights on
the well-being of individuals. For example, data indicates that human rights
compliance leads to health benefits for individuals; 32 that recognition of
human rights standards can lead to more stable and lasting conflict
resolution; 33 and that human rights norms are intimately linked to good
governance. 34 As discussed in greater detail below, the U.S. categorical
federal system is set up to reserve significant areas of policy regulation to
states and localities-particularly in exercise of state police power and in
28. Elizabeth Borgwardt, FDR's Four Freedoms and Wartime Transformations in
America 's Discourse of Rights, in 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 27, at 31, 40-44; Ram Manikkalingam, Promoting
Peace and Protecting Rights: How Are Human Rights Good and Bad for Resolving
Conflict?, 5 ESSEX HuM. RTS. REV. 1, 12 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (recognizing that "the inherent dignity and ... the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977)
(positing human dignity and political equality as the two most basic rights). See generally
Jon Mahoney, Liberalism and the Moral Basis for Human Rights, 27 LAW & PHIL. 151
(2008); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54
EMORY L.J. 97 (2005).
30. Lauren, supra note 27, at 3. See generally Ralph Mclnemy, Natural Law and Human
Rights, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1991).
31. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the
Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 261-62 (2004) (noting the use of
human rights standards to justify military intervention and economic coercion).
32. See Scott Burris, Bebe Loff & Zita Lazzarinni, Are Human Rights Good for Your
Health?, 358 LANCET 1901, 1901 (2001) (noting empirical evidence of links between human
rights and health); Scott Burris, Introduction: Merging Law, Human Rights and Social
Epidemiology, 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 498, 507 (2002) (noting links between law, disease,
and prevention).
33. See Sally Engle Merry, Conflict Resolution vs Human Rights, ANTHROPOLOGY
NEWS, Oct. 2007, at 16, 16.
34. See, e.g., Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States Meeting Within the Council, the European Parliament and the
Commission on European Union Development Policy: "The European Consensus," Council
Development Policy Statement (EU) 14820/05 of 22 Nov. 2005 (emphasizing relationship
between good governance, democracy and respect for human rights); Gudmundur
Alfredsson, The Usefulness of Human Rights for Democracy and Good Governance, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 19, 25-27 (Hans-Otto Sano & Gudmundur
Alfredsson eds., 2002).
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areas touching on families, criminal law, and social welfare. 35  A
subnational government taking action to implement human rights norms in
these areas in particular would be acting consistently with principles of
federalism. Such a government could credibly argue that its acts constitute
good public policy, as well as acts of positive moral force.
As a first cut, the state actions to promote human rights might be divided
between those that focus internally and those that focus externally. This
essay calls the internally focused laws "incorporation" laws, because they
incorporate international human rights standards into local laws that govern
local, domestic practices. The externally focused subnational human rights
laws are called "association" laws, because through these laws, subnational
governments primarily intend to associate their policies with worldwide
efforts to promote human rights in other places, bringing their collective
power to bear to end human rights abuses abroad. However, as explained
further below, the descriptive force of this rough dichotomy is ultimately
limited. Subnational governments, responding to the admonition to "bring
human rights home," increasingly frame laws that do not distinguish
between foreign and local effects, but simply promote compliance with
universal human rights regardless of national borders. These laws both
"incorporate" human rights norms into domestic standards, and serve to
"associate" local governments with international efforts to end human rights
abuses. By straddling these categories, the laws also expose the difficulties
involved in administering the foreign-local distinctions on which current
federal preemption doctrine in this area rests.
A. Subnational "Incorporation " of Human Rights
Many state and local laws incorporate international human rights law
concepts directly as substantive domestic legal standards. One example is
the reference to human dignity in the Montana Constitution. 36 Adopted in
1972, this state constitutional provision was inspired by a similar provision
in the Constitution of Puerto Rico, which reflects the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.37 Other examples of human rights incorporation abound:
in 1998 San Francisco adopted the standards of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as
35. See Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International
Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 359, 362, 373, 392, 395, 406 (2006).
36. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The dignity of the human being is inviolable.").
37. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 20-27 (2004); Heinz Klug,
The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence Lead the Way
to an Expanded Interpretation, 64 MONT. L. REv. 133, 134-35 (2003); Sara A. Rodriguez,
The Impotence of Being Earnest: Status of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
Treatment of Prisoners in Europe and the United States, 33 NEw ENG. J. ON CPIM. & CIV.
CONFNEMENT 61, 111 n.320 (2007)
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its municipal law;38 several states and municipalities have administratively
adopted the substance of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners as baselines for their own prison systems;
39
Massachusetts has statutorily charged its Commission on the Status of
Women with implementing the Platform for Action on women's rights
issued at the United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women held in
Beijing in 1995;40 and in 2000, California adopted the human rights
standards for consular notification on behalf of foreign nationals charged
with criminal violations of U.S. law contained in the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. 41
Most visible subnational incorporation of international human rights law
has been accomplished through legislative or bureaucratic actions. But
some incorporation has been achieved through judicial action. In particular,
a number of state courts and individual state court judges have recognized
the importance of examining domestic actions through the lens of
international human rights standards. For example, in litigation challenging
the State of Missouri's death penalty for minors, the state supreme court,
striking down the state law, noted the international rejection of this practice
as a human rights violation. 42 The state court's decision was later upheld
by the Supreme Court, which also cited the international consensus on the
issue. 43
Individual judges have also taken this approach. For example, when an
Oklahoma court remanded a prisoner's case to determine whether he was
prejudiced by violations of his rights under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, a concurring judge opined that the state had an
38. Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco
CEDA W Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
768, 768 (2004).
39. See, e.g., Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 453, 462 (1975); see also
Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (noting Connecticut's
adoption of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).
40. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 3, § 66(3) (1999).
41. In January 2000, the State of California enacted legislation requiring that "every
peace officer, upon arrest and booking or detention for more than two hours of a known or
suspected foreign national, shall advise the foreign national that he or she has a right to
communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country," and that
law enforcement agencies shall ensure that policy or procedure and training
manuals incorporate language based upon provisions of the [Vienna Convention]
that set forth requirements for handling the arrest and booking or detention for
more than two hours of a foreign national pursuant to this section prior to
December 31, 2000.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (West 2008); see also Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon: The Glass Is Half Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 29, 43 (2007). North Carolina
has also implemented consular notifications standards applicable to instances of involuntary
commitment of noncitizens that reflect the Vienna Convention. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-
344 (2007).
42. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
43. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
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independent international obligation to provide such rights. 44 Similarly, in
Moore v. Ganim, a concurring justice in the Supreme Court of Connecticut
noted the relevance of international human rights law in construing the
state's constitution. 45
On the one hand, such legislative, executive, and judicial incorporation of
international human rights standards into domestic law is unremarkable.
Lawmakers and legal decision makers have always cast a wide net when
searching for new policy ideas and approaches, or evaluating jurisprudential
directions.46 Resnik has written eloquently about the "multiple ports"
through which international human rights can enter domestic law, including
state and local law.47 As she notes, influences come from many sources,
from the federal government to other states to policy think tanks to other
countries.48
On the other hand, subnational incorporation of human rights standards
may be intentionally subversive. While inspiration may come from many
sources, deliberate subnational adoption of international human rights
standards is not always a neutral activity vis-A-vis the federal government.
Even in the act of subnational incorporation, an activity that seems purely
local in nature, subnational governments may in fact be making an outward-
looking statement to both the federal government and to the global
community.49  When San Francisco incorporated CEDAW into its
municipal law, the city's mayor, Willie Brown, expressed his hope that this
local action would have some national effect, perhaps spurring the federal
government to inch towards ratification and implementation of the
Women's Rights Convention. 50  Indeed, following San Francisco's
implementation of CEDAW, the city's municipal efforts have gained
international prominence; San Francisco's participation in global
44. Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *2-3 (Okla. Crim.
App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring). The Governor of Oklahoma carried out this
obligation by commuting the death sentence of defendant Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican
national whose consular rights had been denied during his state criminal proceedings. See
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 n. 4 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Janet Koven
Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in
Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 172 (2004).
45. Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 780 (Conn. 1995) (Peters, J., concurring).
46. See Davis, supra note 35, at 371 n. 52 (describing state legislators' research on
international housing issues to aid drafting of New York State Constitution in 1938). For a
recent snapshot of judicial influences, see generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
47. See generally Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57
EMORY L.J. 31 (2007) [hereinafter Resnik, Horizontal Federalism]; Judith Resnik, Law's
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of
Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Law's Migration].
48. See Resnik, Law's Migration, supra note 47, at 1576; Resnik et al., supra note 5, at
784.
49. Robinson, supra note 5, at 689, 691-92.
50. Davis, supra note 20, at 135-36.
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conferences and its appearance in reports on CEDAW implementation
certainly underscores the U.S. government's failure to ratify the treaty. 51
Taking the broadest view, then, even these seemingly benign, inwardly
focused instances of domestic incorporation of human rights norms might
be seen as impinging on federal foreign affairs prerogatives that have been
expressed through inaction. San Francisco's incorporation of CEDAW
might be seen as interfering with the federal government's deliberate
inaction on CEDAW; the federal failure to ratify CEDAW has international
implications that might be influenced if more subnational governments
acted as San Francisco has, communicating the internal dissent on the issue
to a global audience. Likewise, California's adoption of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations standards could be seen as thumbing the
state's nose at Congress's decision to not enact legislation implementing the
treaty on the national level; again, the federal government's inaction may
itself be a statement of its foreign policy, and California's action may
undermine the intended foreign impact of the federal inaction.
Nevertheless, to date, these subnational incorporation efforts, generally
effectuated through democratic processes at the local level, have not been
challenged as impinging on federal foreign affairs authority. As Resnik
notes, the challengers to subnational human rights laws have thus far been
entities that perceive an economic reason to challenge the law, and most
"incorporation" laws do not impose immediate or obvious financial burdens
on any specific group, but simply adopt passive normative standards. 52
B. Subnational "Association "with International Human Rights Efforts
Many subnational human rights efforts involve adoption of domestic law,
but also deliberately and intentionally associate the subnational government
with a global effort to end human rights abuses in a particular locality or
region. The state and local South African divestment initiatives of decades
past are a good example. Like the "incorporation" laws discussed above,
these provisions incorporated substantive human rights standards.
However, they also focused on exploiting the external impact of these
standards through the financial mechanisms available to local governments.
During the 1980s, thirty-seven states, thirty-two counties, and 105 cities in
the United States enacted either divestment or procurement legislation to
limit their own investment and procurement from companies doing business
with South Africa's apartheid regime.53  Under these laws, local
governments were required to divest public holdings of stocks in firms that
did business with South Africa, or to restrict procurement opportunities
when the bidder for a government contract did business with South Africa.
51. See S.F. COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, PROGRESS REPORT #5 (2001),
http://www.sfgov.org/site/cosw-page.asp?id=10870; UNITED NATIONS DEv. FUND FOR
WOMEN, BRINGING EQUALITY HOME: IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (Ilana Landsberg-Lewis ed., 1998).
52. See Resnik, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 47, at 78.
53. See Robinson, supra note 5, at 698-99.
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The cumulative effect of such local laws was an important factor in the
demise of the apartheid regime in 2001.54
The success of the South African divestment campaign has led other
human rights campaigns to adopt similar strategies. Beginning in the
1990s, many municipalities and several states enacted selective purchasing
laws directed against Burma, joining an international effort to restore
democracy to that country. 55 Likewise, a vibrant student movement is
urging divestment from Sudan, which has engaged in a series of massive
genocidal campaigns and human rights abuses in that region. 56 In March
2006, the University of California Regents voted to divest not only primary
holdings but also indirect holdings in companies doing business with
Sudan.57 Other campuses, both public and private, are following suit.58
Further, more than two dozen states have enacted laws to limit their state
pension funds' investment in Sudan. 59
Divestment activities are not the only subnational initiatives that fall into
the "association" category. Many states and localities have adopted
resolutions calling for the federal ratification of CEDAW or the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC).60 These formal subnational statements
focus their effects outward, both seeking greater federal attention to
CEDAW and alerting the international community to the depth of support
for CEDAW among state and local actors. By adopting such resolutions,
states and localities seek to associate with a global human rights movement
rather than establish normative legal baselines at the local level. Through
these efforts, subnational governments establish and strengthen horizontal
relationships with other governmental and nongovernmental entities
worldwide.
54. See Davis, supra note 20, at 130.
55. See Peter Fitzgerald, Massachusetts, Burma and the World Trade Organization: A
Commentary on Blacklisting, Federalism, and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era,
34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (2001) ("As of June 2000... twenty-four municipal, county, or
state governments had enacted selective purchasing laws specifically targeting Burma.").
56. See Philip Rucker, Student-Driven Sudan Divestment Campaign Grows, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2006, at B9.
57. See Tanya Schevitz & Jim Doyle, UC Regents Vote to Shed Sudan Investments, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 17, 2006, at Al.
58. As of publication, sixty-one large universities had "adopted divestment policies"
with respect to Sudan. Sudan Divestment Task Force: Divestment Statistics,
http://www.sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
59. As of publication, twenty-seven states had divested from Sudan with divestment
campaigns initiated in ten other states. Id.
60. A list of state and local governments that have endorsed the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), issued by the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, is available at
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/public I/human rights/entitiessuppcrc.pdf. With
regard to CEDAW, see Resnik, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 47, at 56-57 ("As of
2004, forty-four cities, eighteen counties, and sixteen states have passed or considered
legislation relating to CEDAW, with yet others contemplating action. Many localities




Not surprisingly, "association" laws involving investment and
procurement have been controversial, and have attracted more challengers
than those laws that incorporate international standards as domestic law
without immediately identifiable financial implications for global business.
Unlike a municipal CEDAW, for example, local procurement and
investment laws put a tangible financial burden on corporate interests.
Perhaps because of the strong connections between the U.S. civil rights
movement and the efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, and the fear that
detractors would be labeled prosegregation, few legal challenges were
mounted to antiapartheid divestment initiatives. 61 However, more recent
divestment and procurement laws targeting other human rights violators
have been actively challenged in federal court by trade organizations such
as the National Foreign Trade Council, seeking to avoid a patchwork of
state laws regulating investment in markets that its members deem
profitable. In Crosby and Giannoulias, federal courts struck down such
provisions as preempted by federal foreign policy activity. 62
C. Subnational "Association" and "Incorporation"
As noted above, the rough dichotomy between domestic "incorporation"
laws that adopt human rights norms as internal standards and "association"
laws that bring local power to bear on external human rights abuses is
highly imperfect since most local human rights laws contain elements of
both approaches. 63 This dichotomy breaks down further in the face of the
growing movement to "bring human rights home" and acknowledge human
rights abuses in the United States as well as abroad. For example, many
states and localities in the United States have adopted antisweatshop
procurement policies.64 These policies monitor the human rights and labor
practices of state and municipal contractors and subcontractors to ensure
that businesses involved in exploitative practices do not become business
partners of subnational governments. These laws incorporate human rights
standards into local law and also associate states and localities with a global
human rights movement to end sweatshop labor practices.
Unlike the South Africa, Burma, and Sudan campaigns, the pinch of
these measures is intended to be felt not just in foreign jurisdictions charged
with human rights abuses, but also at home in the United States, where
homegrown sweatshops are proliferating alongside their foreign
counterparts. 65  As activists abandon the rhetoric of United States
61. See Davis, supra note 20, at 130-31.
62. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000); Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741-42 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
63. Problems addressed by subnational governments are often both domestic and
foreign. Resnik et al., supra note 5, at 716.
64. See generally Adrian Barnes, Do They Have to Buy from Burma?: A Preemption
Analysis of LocalAntisweatshop Procurement Laws, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 426 (2007).
65. See, e.g., MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN
WORKERS TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY 41-47 (2001); Jennifer Gordon, American
Sweatshops, BOSTON REv., Summer 2005, at 11. Indeed, this pinch caused the Mayor of
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exceptionalism and trace the connections between global human rights
abuses and domestic policies, subnational human rights laws are likely to
become less explicitly focused on "foreign" places.
This trend exposes some important questions about the taxonomy of
subnational human rights laws, a taxonomy that has developed as an
outgrowth of court decisions that rest on the question of whether a
subnational law runs afoul of federal foreign affairs power. If a connection
to foreign affairs is the key component, where does a subnational
antisweatshop law fall on the continuum between San Francisco's CEDAW
incorporation law, which has not been challenged in court, and
Massachusetts's foreign-focused Burma Law, which was struck down by
the Supreme Court?66  In the contemporary era, where subnational
governments are involved in a range of global activities, which of these
distinct approaches impinges on national foreign affairs to a sufficient
degree to require preemption? And when a democratically generated
subnational law is at issue, which branch of the federal government should
make that decision?
II. FEDERAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SUBNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
The federal judicial response to subnational human rights laws in Crosby,
Garamendi, and Giannoulias is in obvious tension with a simultaneous
trend, reflected in Medellin, to reserve a more expansive policy-setting role
for states and localities within the federal system, even when foreign
relationships are implicated and undermined. Instead of approaching the
issue of subnational human rights laws with sensitivity to states' and
localities' roles in implementing human rights norms, the federal courts
have found federal preemption even in instances where Congress has not
acted and where there has been no explicit federal effort to occupy the
field.67  This essay reviews the relevant preemption cases below,
contrasting them with the recent decision in Medellin, where the Supreme
Court preserved the right of states to default from human rights norms
despite the clear and present impact of this state policy on U.S. foreign
relations. It concludes that the breadth with which the federal preemption
doctrine has been wielded to preclude positive human rights activities by
states creates an unjustified asymmetry. This arrangement serves to chill
states from engaging in efforts to expand human rights compliance-efforts
that would be beneficial both domestically and globally-while permitting
states to freely ignore human rights norms absent specific congressional
action.
New York to challenge New York City's antisweatshop ordinance. Mayor of N.Y. v.
Council of N.Y., 789 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 2004). The ordinance was enjoined on grounds
other than federal preemption. Id. at 862-65.
66. See generally Barnes, supra note 64.




This essay does not intend to question the general propriety of federal
preemption. Though the doctrine of federal preemption is judge-made law,
it arises from the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. Under the doctrine,
once the federal government has acted in an area of law, "'any state law...
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.' ' 68 There
are three generally recognized, but overlapping, categories of preemption:
express, conflict, and field. Express preemption, which is triggered by an
explicit act of Congress and not questioned in this essay, occurs when a
federal statute or regulation contains language that specifically displaces
state authority in a given area.69
In contrast to express preemption, the two types of implied preemption-
conflict and field preemption-give much more discretion to the federal
judiciary to ascertain congressional intent. Both have been employed in the
federal cases involving subnational human rights implementation to strike
down laws based on slimly supported presumptions about the national
government's foreign affairs goals. Conflict preemption occurs when
compliance with both the state and federal law is impossible, or the state
rule obstructs the achievement of federal objectives. 70 Field preemption
occurs when the federal interest in the field is "so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject."'71 As the case descriptions below make clear, the federal authority
over foreign affairs has been invoked to support both of these categories of
nonexpress preemption. The question raised here is whether, when states
implement widely accepted human rights norms through a democratic
process on the subnational level, the judicial doctrines of implied
preemption should be modified to better encourage and permit such
implementation in the absence of any express congressional statement to
the contrary.
A. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
In 1996, the Massachusetts state legislature enacted a statute that
imposed economic penalties on companies doing business with Burma, and
barred any state investment in Burma by Massachusetts. 72 This Act, the
"Burma Law," sought to control a narrow set of activities within
Massachusetts, but only insofar as the activities might affect the human
rights situation in Burma. 73 Burma had long denied basic freedoms to its
68. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (quoting Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988)).
69. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 96 (2004).
70. Id.
71. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
72. KEVrN DANAHER & JASON MARK, INSURRECTION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO
CORPORATE POWER 204 (2003); Davis, supra note 20, at 132-34; Guay, supra note 21, at
354-55.
73. Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, U.S. Constitutional Law-State Statutes
Imposing Indirect Sanctions on Foreign Countries-Federal Pre-emption--Sanctions
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citizens, and monitoring groups have detailed a litany of abuses including
child conscription, rape, murder, and forced labor. 74 According to Amnesty
International, "'torture has become an institution' in Burma. 75 Responding
to these massive human rights violations, the Massachusetts Burma Law
deliberately built on earlier efforts to economically isolate South Africa in
order to end apartheid, in part through subnational economic divestment
and sanctions.76 The goal of the Burma Law, like its South Africa-focused
predecessors, was to end foreign human rights violations.
Shortly after the Massachusetts Burma Law was enacted, Congress
passed a federal statute imposing a narrower set of mandatory and
conditional sanctions on Burma. The federal law authorized the President
to impose further sanctions if certain conditions were met. In 1997,
President William J. Clinton issued an executive order providing for
additional sanctions, prohibiting new investment in Burma by "United
States persons." 77 Neither the congressional statute nor the executive order
specifically stated an intent to preclude preexisting state laws directed
against Burma. Further, neither the statute nor the executive order
specifically addressed the nineteen municipal government laws already in
place restricting purchases from companies doing business in Burma.
However, the executive order did state that the Burmese government's acts
of oppression constituted "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States. ' '78
The proliferation of state and local Burma Laws triggered protests by a
number of U.S. trading partners in international fora. For example, Japan
and the European Union lodged formal complaints with the World Trade
Organization, claiming that the Massachusetts law "violates certain
provisions of the Agreement on Government Procurement." 79  The
executive branch also expressed concern. Before the Supreme Court, and in
earlier testimony before state governments, the Executive "consistently
represented that the state Act has complicated its dealings with foreign
sovereigns and proven an impediment to accomplishing objectives assigned
it by Congress."80 Yet Congress never sought to explicitly preempt the
state and local laws that were causing these alleged complications.
In April 1998, the National Foreign Trade Council filed suit challenging
Massachusetts's Burma Law, arguing that it infringed on federal foreign
Against Myanmar (Burma), in International Decisions, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 750 (Bernard
H. Oxman ed., 2000) (stating that Massachusetts law was aimed at punishing the repressive
military government of Burma).
74. See The Burma Campaign UK: About Burma, Human Rights, http://www.
burmacampaign.org.uk/aboutburma/humanrights.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
75. Id. (quoting Amnesty International).
76. DANAHER & MARK, supra note 72, at 204.
77. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. §§ 202-204 (May 20, 1997).
78. Id.




affairs power and was preempted by the federal Burma Law. 81 The district
court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed, enjoining
operation of the Massachusetts Law.82 In June 2000, the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower courts, striking down Massachusetts's Burma Law; the
Supreme Court determined that the federal government had preempted state
activities in the area.83 As to the question of Congress's failure to explicitly
provide for preemption, the Court concluded that
[a] failure to provide for preemption expressly may reflect nothing more
than the settled character of implied preemption doctrine that courts will
dependably apply, and in any event, the existence of conflict cognizable
under the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express congressional
recognition that federal and state law may conflict.84
However, the Court also noted that there was no direct conflict between
the state and federal law. Rather, because the laws were not coextensive,
"if the Massachusetts law is enforceable[,] the President has less to offer
and less economic and diplomatic leverage as a consequence. ' 85 The
Massachusetts Burma Law would simply "blunt the consequences of
discretionary Presidential action," rather than create a direct conflict.86
Invoking an expansive version of conflict preemption, the Court determined
that the inconsistent means adopted by Massachusetts were sufficient to
create a conflict supporting preemption. 87
Finally, the Court analyzed the question through the lens of field
preemption, examining the ways in which the "state Act is at odds with the
President's intended authority to speak for the United States" on matters of
foreign relations. 88 Crediting the protests of U.S. trade partners as well as
statements by the Executive about the diplomatic difficulties posed by
Massachusetts's legislation, the Court concluded that the administration's
actions through the executive order preempted the entire field and precluded
Massachusetts's execution of its own foreign human rights agenda through
the Burma Law. 89
The analysis adopted in Crosby, of course, could doom any subnational
action in the area of human rights, including states' hortatory resolutions
without any formal sanction behind them. Any subnational action that is
not coextensive with federal action will necessarily dilute the impact of the
federal action. Likewise, as discussed above, a very wide range of state or
local laws may have global implications that would, under the Court's
analysis, support the case for field preemption. The Court, however,
81. Id. at 371.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 388.
84. Id. at 387-88.
85. Id. at 377.
86. Id. at 376.
87. The Court's approach here drew heavily on its prior decision in Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
88. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380.
89. Id. at 383-85.
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provided no limiting principle. Indeed, in response to the state's claim that
local South African sanctions would be preempted under the same analysis,
the Court only offered the fact that "we never ruled on whether state and
local sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were preempted or
otherwise invalid" 9 0 -a nondistinction between the Burma campaign and
the highly successful subnational efforts against South African apartheid.
B. American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi
Garamendi involved a challenge to California's Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA), enacted in 1999.91 Through HVIRA,
California sought to pressure certain insurers to compensate European
Holocaust victims by requiring any insurer doing business in the state to
disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and
1945 by the company or related entity upon penalty of loss of its state
business license.92 HVIRA built on the state's earlier amendment to the
California Insurance Code, making it an unfair business practice for any
insurer operating in the state to "fail[] to pay any valid claim from
Holocaust survivors." 93
The federal government was simultaneously engaged in efforts to obtain
restitution for Holocaust victims. In an agreement concluded in 2000, the
U.S. and German governments established the German Foundation
Agreement, a fund that makes payments to Holocaust survivors and that
covers personal injury claims and certain property loss or damage caused by
German companies during the Nazi era, including claims against German
banks and insurance companies. 94 Through this executive agreement, not
expressly approved by Congress, the President agreed that whenever a
German company was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in U.S. court, the U.S.
government would (1) submit a statement that it would be in this country's
foreign policy interests for the German Foundation to provide the exclusive
forum and remedy for such claims, and (2) try to get state and local
governments to respect the Foundation as the exclusive mechanism for
resolving claims.95
When California began enforcing HVIRA, the U.S. government
immediately informed the state that its actions might undermine the
German Foundation agreement. 96 When the state insurance commissioner
persisted in enforcing the state law, the American Insurance Association
challenged HVIRA's constitutionality. 97
90. Id. at 388.
91. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
92. Id. at 409.
93. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.15(a) (West 2005).
94. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 405.
95. See id. at 406.
96. Id. at411.
97. Id. at 411-12.
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As with Crosby, the California law and the federal executive agreement
at issue in Garamendi did not squarely conflict. In fact, the Court noted
that "[t]he situation ... calls to mind the impact of the Massachusetts
Burma Law on the effective exercise of the President's power."98 Rather,
the California law and the executive agreement employed different means
to reach the same ends-according to the Court, "California seeks to use an
iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves." 99 But
unlike Crosby, this quasi conflict did not pit a federal law against a state
law; instead, on the federal side, there was no congressional action involved
at all, simply an executive initiative.
Despite the absence of any congressional action, the Court ruled that the
California law was preempted by the federal government's scheme to
secure an economic settlement for damages arising from the Holocaust. 00
"It is true that the President in this case is acting without express
congressional authority," wrote the Court, but "the President possesses
considerable independent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the
United States on international issues."' 101 It follows, the Court said, that a
"conflict with the exercise of that authority" is sufficient to find preemption
of state law. 102
C. National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias
Despite the Supreme Court's rulings in Crosby and Garamendi,
subnational governments continue to test the limits of preemption with new
"associational" laws directed at external human rights abuses. Many of
these laws have been directed against Sudan, in an effort to deter the
ongoing atrocities in the Darfur region. Charging genocide, the U.S.
Department of State listed the situation in Darfur as the world's worst
human rights abuse in 2006.103 As of February 2008, twenty states, along
with many municipalities, had adopted laws restricting financial dealings
with Sudan.104
98. Id. at 423.
99. Id. at 427.
100. Id. at 421.
101. Id. at 424 n.14.
102. Id. at 425 (stating that express federal policy and clear conflict are enough to require
the state law to yield).
103. Darfur Tops US List of Worst Human Rights Abuses, USATODAY.COM, Mar. 6,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-03-06-human-rightsN.htm.
104. These efforts are not only focused on Sudan. Similar laws mandating divestment
from Iran have also recently been enacted in thirteen states, including Florida, California,
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The Illinois Sudan Act was signed into law in 2006.105 The Act amended
two Illinois state laws, the Deposit of State Moneys Act and the Illinois
Pension Code, to prohibit certain investments in the government of Sudan
and in companies doing business in Sudan. 10 6 In particular, the Act
prohibited the Illinois Treasurer from depositing state funds into any
financial institution that had not certified that its loan applicants did no
business with "forbidden entities," defined to include any company
involved with Sudan.' 07 The Act also amended the Illinois Pension Code to
prohibit the fiduciary of any pension fund established under the Code from
investing in any company unless the company certified that it did no
business with a "forbidden entity."10 8 The articulated purpose of the bill
was to curtail human rights abuses in Sudan. 109
The federal government has also turned its attention to the events
unfolding in Sudan."l0 In 1997, President Clinton issued an executive order
prohibiting a wide range of transactions between the United States and
Sudan. 111 In 2002, the Sudan Peace Act gave additional authority to the
President to address the U.S. relationship with Sudan and required regular
briefings of Congress on the status of efforts to resolve the Sudan
conflict. 112 The Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, passed in 2004,
instructed the President to seek imposition of United Nations sanctions if
the government of Sudan failed to comply with certain agreements and
Security Council resolutions. 113 Finally, in 2006, Congress passed the
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which restricted travel and froze U.S.
assets of certain Sudanese government officials. 114  Because Illinois's
pension funds are not controlled by the federal government, none of these
Acts imposed any express restriction on Illinois's investment policies."l 5
The National Foreign Trade Council challenged Illinois's law on behalf
of its members that qualified as "forbidden entities" under Illinois law. 116
105. The Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan, Public Act 094-0079 (June
27, 2005, effective Jan. 27, 2006), repealed by Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias,




108. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-110.6 (2006).
109. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 734.
110. Id. at 735.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 736; see also Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, 116 Stat. 1504 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 2004)).
113. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736; see also Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-497, 118 Stat. 4012 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp.
IV 2004)).
114. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736; see also Darfur Peace and Accountability Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-344, 120 Stat. 1869 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV
2004)).
115. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 736-42.
116. Id. at 736.
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An opinion issued by the federal district court in February 2007 granted a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the Illinois Sudan Act.1 17
In analyzing the amendments to the Illinois Deposit of State Moneys law,
the court noted that "it is possible to comply with both federal law
regulating business dealings with Sudan and the Illinois Sudan Act."1 18
But, the court concluded, following Crosby and Garamendi, differences in
approach between the federal government and the state were sufficient to
support preemption. 119 Invoking both conflict and field preemption, the
court wrote, "the Illinois Sudan Act's lack of flexibility, extended
geographic reach, and impact on foreign entities interferes with the national
government's conduct of foreign affairs," despite the absence of a direct
conflict. 120
On the question of the amendments to the Illinois Pension Code, the
court reached a different conclusion.' 21 These amendments, the court
observed, imposed a less tangible burden that might not have any impact on
companies' decisions to do business in Sudan. 122 This law therefore did not
obstruct federal foreign policy goals in the region.
In analyzing these Illinois laws, the court specifically noted that the
Supreme Court's earlier decisions had not yet delineated "with clarity what
role, if any, the states retain" in foreign affairs.' 23  In an attempt to
articulate a rule of decision for these cases, the court opined that Supreme
Court rulings would not appear to prohibit a state or local government from
issuing a resolution condemning actions of a foreign government, even if
the national government had made no such declaration or did not support
such a view. 124 According to the court, "[i]n such a case, although the
United States would not be speaking with 'one voice,' the absence of actual
hindrance to the national government's conduct of foreign policy would
appear to preserve the state or local enactment." 125
The court further averred that "sister state" agreements or other bilateral
agreements between subnational governments appear to be beyond the
reach of the preemption doctrine, provided they have no "practical
effect... on the national government's ability to conduct foreign policy on
behalf of the United States."' 26 In short, the district court would require
evidence of tangible effects of state law on foreign policy in order to permit
federal preemption; the speculative effects that plaintiffs identified as
arising from the pension amendments, i.e., the mere possibility that a
117. Id. at 750-51.
118. Id. at 737.
119. Id. at 741-42.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 742.
122. Id. at 746.






company's investment practices would be influenced by the Act, were not
sufficient.127
Yet, while it does confront the issue, the Giannoulias court leaves the
precise content of "real" foreign policy effects largely undefined. Certainly,
few would dispute that the judicial branch is the branch of government with
the weakest claim to foreign policy expertise. Because judges are not privy
to the nuances of the nation's foreign affairs agenda, and are not directly
involved in setting that agenda, they are reduced to examining only the
most visible aspects of foreign affairs-formal protests or international
complaints by foreign governments, and so on-to determine when
subnational policies have resulted in some tangible interference with federal
foreign policy. This focus on the actions of foreign governments actually
reduces the foreign-policy-defining role of the executive and legislative
branches, which may actually tolerate much more tension, ambiguity, and
nuance than the foreign government (or the U.S. courts) might.
Indeed, in the wake of the Giannoulias ruling, Congress clarified its
support for subnational divestment laws by passing the Sudan
Accountability and Divestment Act, intended to provide assurances to states
and municipalities that local divestment legislation would be protected from
preemption challenges. 128 The law is denominated as "[a]n Act to authorize
State and local governments to divest assets in companies that conduct
business operations in Sudan. ' 129 However, whether the law actually has
this impact remains unclear. In an effort to preserve the Executive's
authority to override Congress's authorization, should it conflict with
executive foreign policy priorities, President George W. Bush's signing
statement accompanying the new law stated that,
This Act purports to authorize State and local governments to divest from
companies doing business in named sectors in Sudan and thus risks being
interpreted as insulating from Federal oversight State and local divestment
actions that could interfere with implementation of national foreign
policy. However, as the Constitution vests the exclusive authority to
conduct foreign relations with the Federal Government, the executive
branch shall construe and enforce this legislation in a manner that does
not conflict with that authority. 130
Through this signing statement, President Bush sought to extend executive
power even beyond the broad scope found in Garamendi, to permit the
Executive to flout explicit congressional legislation permitting subnational
human rights laws. Though criticized widely, the President's gambit has
not been tested in court. As some scholars have observed, however, this
executive action fits within a pattern in which the "federal government
127. Id.
128. Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, §§ 1-12,
121 Stat. 2516 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 2004)).
129. Id. pmbl.
130. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President (Dec. 31, 2007),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071231 html.
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pressed expansive understandings of the President's authority over...
'foreign' affairs."'131
D. Medellin v. Texas
The Executive's foreign affairs authority has certainly not been given
such wide scope when the President's goal is to promote subnational
implementation of human rights norms in the absence of congressional
implementation.
Medellin considered whether the State of Texas was obligated to give
credence to a federal executive order mandating the state's compliance with
the terms of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 132 The United
States is a signatory to the Convention, which requires that non-nationals
charged with a crime be informed of their right to contact their consulate for
assistance prior to trial. 133
Most crimes are charged at the state level, so state implementation of the
Vienna Convention is critical to its effectiveness. 134  However, state
implementation has been spotty at best. Some states, like California, have
adopted the consular notification requirement as their own state law. 135
Others, like Texas, have resisted the requirement. 136 Some, like Florida,
have enacted legislation that affirmatively flouts the international human
rights norms. 137
This patchwork implementation has resulted in real, tangible impacts on
U.S. foreign relations. The governments of Mexico and Germany have
independently charged the United States with treaty violations before the
ICJ. 138 In each instance, the United States was found to be in violation. 139
The problem is compounded by the fact that some of the nonnationals
whose rights have been affected are charged with the death penalty, giving
the nations from which they hail an additional reason to protest the U.S.
procedures.
131. Resnik et al., supra note 5, at 781.
132. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352-53 (2008).
133. Id. at 1357 n.4.
134. See id. at 1363.
135. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 834(c)(a)(1) (West 2000).
136. Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Craig L. Jackson, Leticia Van de Putte & Rodney Ellis,
Avena and the World Court's Death Penalty Jurisdiction in Texas: Addressing the Odd
Notion of Texas's Independence from the World, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 455, 503 (2005).
137. Marc J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon andArticle 36 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, The Right to Consul, and
Remediation, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1232 (2006) (stating that Florida's statute explicitly
states that "failure to provide consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations... shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding against any foreign national
and shall not be cause for the foreign national's discharge from custody" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
138. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31);
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 12 (Mar. 3).
139. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72 (ordering the United States to provide review and
reconsideration of convictions and sentences "by means of its own choosing"); see also
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 516-17 (same).
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In 2006, following yet another loss before the ICJ, the Bush
administration issued a memorandum directing states to comply with the
terms of the Vienna Convention and, presumably, to provide some
additional process to assess whether cases that had already gone to trial
might have had different outcomes if the defendants' consular rights had
been honored.14 0 The State of Texas disputed its obligation to comply with
the executive memorandum on, among others, the grounds that (1)
decisions of the ICJ are not directly binding on states; and (2) the executive
memorandum is ineffective to implement the Vienna Convention and
nonbinding, since only congressional action can implement a non-self-
executing treaty.14 1
The Supreme Court majority upheld the state's assertions, ruling that the
State of Texas has no obligation to abide by the Vienna Convention absent
congressional implementation. 142  In concurrence, Justice John Paul
Stevens underscored the moral obligation that should still weigh on Texas,
but also agreed that there was no legal bar to Texas's planned execution of
Jose Medellin.] 43
The questions presented to the Court were narrow and leave open some
additional issues concerning state compliance with international law. For
example, the federal government has long taken the position that states have
an obligation through the federal system to implement international human
rights obligations undertaken at the federal level. 144 The Medellin decision
seems to confirm the notion of state obligation, but ties it directly to the
international system rather than routing it through the federal structure.
Perhaps this posits a new, more direct relationship between the states and
the international system, but the Court does not directly address this.
Medellin does, however, illustrate a troubling asymmetry between the
treatment of subnational initiatives that promote internationally accepted
rights versus those that undermine such rights. The Garamendi and
Medellin cases are similar in one important sense: in both, state activities
apparently had an impact on foreign relations. But in Medellin, specific
congressional action was deemed necessary in order to keep states from
violating human rights norms; executive action in exercise of its foreign
affairs power was insufficient. In Garamendi, executive action alone was
sufficient to preempt state legislative action that would promote human
140. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President, U.S., to U.S. Attorney Gen. (Feb.
28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-
18.html.
141. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 9-11, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008)
(No. 06-984).
142. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
143. Id. at 1375 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. 138 CONG. REc. 8071 (1992) (noting that states and local governments "shall"
implement Covenant obligations in areas within their jurisdiction); see also 140 CONG. REC.
14326 (1994) (same understanding for CERD); 136 CONG. REc. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1990) (same understanding for Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
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rights, and might thus more closely ally subnational governments with
external human rights forces outside of the United States. 145
III. PROMOTING SUBNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS:
UP FROM THE CELLAR
Unbowed by the Supreme Court's repeated rejection of subnational
initiatives, states and localities continue to pursue human rights efforts in an
ever-wider range of arenas. These efforts are, by and large, democratic
exercises, initiated and approved by the people or endorsed by elected
officials. However, the Garamendi line of cases discussed above invites
further challenges to, for example, local Sudan divestment laws, Iran
divestment initiatives, antisweatshop laws, local CEDAWs and
Conventions on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and subnational
adoption of Vienna Convention standards, based on implied preemption.
Courts are ill-equipped to adopt the Giannoulias court's approach to
determining which of these subnational initiatives have tangible foreign
affairs effects that usurp the executive function. 146 The Supreme Court has
so far avoided making such determinations by adopting broad parameters
for federal preemption.1 47 Yet the effect of such a broad application of
federal preemption doctrine is to undermine exercises of democracy at the
subnational level; to eliminate the positive tension, dialogue, and policy
depth associated with federalism; and to chill more comprehensive
implementation of widely accepted human rights norms in the United States
consistent with the recognized role of subnational governments in human
rights implementation.
As courts examine these future challenges, this essay proposes the
following two guiding principles, consistent with the Constitution's
structural allocations of foreign affairs power. These proposed principles
are intended to challenge perpetuation of an "upstairs, downstairs" approach
to federal preemption by instead reflecting the realities and benefits of
subnational governments' horizontal involvement in global issues. These
principles are also intended to respect the importance of structural checks
and balances in U.S. law relating to human rights implementation.
First, the tension between subnational and national policy approaches,
while at times uncomfortable and destabilizing, also has important benefits.
Broad versions of the implied preemption doctrine should not be applied to
undermine the tension inherent in coexisting state and federal sovereignty.
Any attempt to eliminate this tension implicates the very autonomy of state
sovereigns that the Court recognized in Medellin, which is a critical
component of our system of government. A broad version of federal
145. One might ask whether Medellin v. Texas might have been decided differently if it
were framed as a preemption case. The petitioners included these arguments in their briefs,
but the Court did not squarely address them. Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 141,
at i.
146. See supra text Part II.C.
147. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 n.14 (2003).
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preemption has the potential to cut off robust dialogue between the states
and the federal government in the area of human rights, limiting the
inherent benefits that might otherwise be derived from the federal
system. 148 Like the upstairs Bellamys, certain interests within the federal
government may want to keep states "in their place" under the stairs, barred
from forming productive international alliances without express federal
approval. This sort of limitation is not only undesirable as a matter of our
federal system, it is also simply not possible in an era of global social,
economic, and political connections. Indeed, states are already covert
"players" in many international arenas. 149 Their participation in these
arenas is an important component of creating balanced federal policies.
Second, judicial interference with subnational human-rights-promoting
activities should be disfavored, and subnational governments should instead
be encouraged to maximize their incorporation of and association with
human rights norms. As Justice Stevens cogently recognized in his
concurrence in Medellin, recognition of human rights norms is a net good
for the United States, not to mention humanity in general.'5 0 More
pointedly, in implementing human rights norms, subnational governments
help bring the United States as a whole into compliance with its
international obligations. Indeed, state implementation may be the only
means of realizing certain human rights on the domestic level. Federal
imposition of human rights standards might run afoul of federalism
constraints 151 by interfering with state police powers or other areas
traditionally reserved to state and local regulation such as family or criminal
law. But if the subnational government itself chooses to adopt human rights
standards, particularly if those standards comport with international
obligations that have been assumed by the federal government, the positive
effect is to expand human rights protections within the United States. This
should surely weigh against interfering with such state and local decisions.
These two guiding principles lead to a conclusion about the application
of implied federal preemption to instances of subnational human rights
implementation. Just as the Court recognized in Medellin that
congressional action is generally required to force implementation of a
treaty subnationally, 152 a prerequisite to preemption of subnational human-
148. See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 245, 249
(2001).
149. See Resnik et al., supra note 5, at 740, 784.
150. According to Justice Stevens,
the costs of refusing to respect the ICJ's judgment are significant .... When the
honor of the Nation is balanced against the modest cost of compliance, Texas
would do well to recognize that more is at stake than whether judgments of the
ICJ, and the principled admonitions of the President of the United States, trump
state procedural rules in the absence of implementing legislation.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. at 1375 (Stevens, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying
notes 26-32 (discussing the benefits of human rights policies).
151. Davis, supra note 35, at 362.
152. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369.
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rights-promoting activity should be a statement by Congress expressing its
intention to preclude such activities in the field or its conclusion that
subnational activities are interfering with the conduct of foreign affairs.
Absent such positive preemptive action, subnational activity to promote
human rights should be permitted to proceed just as freely as subnational
efforts to undermine or ignore human rights norms are permitted to proceed
under Medellin.153 Courts should not exercise the implied preemption
doctrine to curtail subnational human rights efforts.' 54
Significantly, this conclusion is not in tension with the accepted notion
that ultimate foreign affairs power rests with the federal government. Even
within the United States, the federal government has recognized a role for
states and cities in implementing the United States' international
obligations.1 55 The starting point is the U.S. Constitution, which provides
that ratified treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination (CERD) are not just relevant to the federal
government, but constitute the "supreme Law of the Land" binding on the
"Judges in every State." 156 Further, the U.S. government has repeatedly
observed that state and local authorities have an independent role to play in
implementation of ratified treaties. According to the statements made by
the U.S. Senate in ratifying CERD (1994), the ICCPR (1992), and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1994),
the United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by
the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take
measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent
authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate
measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant. 1 5 7
In other words, the federal government takes responsibility for
implementing human rights treaties only so far, and leaves the rest to state
and local authorities.
153. This principle was recently proposed by Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin, and Joseph
Frueh, who argue that, "[a]bsent a clear statement from Congress directing preemption, the
judiciary ought to be reluctant to ban local majoritarian activities .... Indeed, local actions
could have a stronger claim to judicial deference than ... congressional actions .... Resnik
et al., supra note 5, at 774.
154. Of course, Congress might take another route entirely and take steps to domestically
implement human rights agreements once they are ratified. If, for example, CERD was fully
implemented domestically, the question of federal preemption would turn on whether the
federal statute overcomes the state or local initiative-an inquiry that does not require the
federal court to speculate about foreign affairs agendas and impacts, though it may raise
some of the same questions about state and local roles in human rights implementation under
the federal system.
155. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
156. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §1, cl. 2.
157. 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992).
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But what, then, are the areas over which state and local governments
properly exercise jurisdiction? The United States offered its view in 1994
when it submitted its first report to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee detailing its compliance with the ICCPR. According to the
federal government, its authority did not extend to those areas where state
and local governments exercised significant responsibilities, including
"matters such as education, public health, business organization, work
conditions, marriage and divorce, the care of children and exercise of the
ordinary police power."'158 Again, the United States reiterated that it would
"remove any federal inhibition to the abilities of the constituent states to
meet their obligations" under the ICCPR and presumably any other ratified
treaty. 59
While perhaps efficient in their time, the vertical households of the
Upstairs, Downstairs era ultimately toppled when downstairs servants
gained recognition of their full range of relationships and found new
horizontal opportunities-opportunities that gave them greater autonomy
and independence. The factors in play were largely external to these
households. A tighter rein from the master of the house would have done
nothing to reverse the trend. The Upstairs, Downstairs metaphor holds here
as well. The federal courts have spoken through their implied preemption
cases, and the executive branch has threatened to unilaterally challenge
state activity with a foreign flavor, yet state efforts to form horizontal
alliances and to implement human rights policies continue. A tighter
federal rein, with broad judicial applications of implied preemption, has not
deterred either new or old forms of subnational action, which are often
supported by the international community. 60
Like the downstairs servants of the past, subnational governments are not
content with their domestic "place" in an exclusively vertical federal
arrangement and seek recognition of their capacities in the larger world.
This essay concludes that, when subnational entities act to promote widely
accepted human rights norms, in the absence of congressional instructions
to the contrary, the federal courts should allow the fruits of these
subnational horizontal arrangements to grow and ripen in ways that further
human rights.
158. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1993: United
States ofAmerica, 1 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/8 l/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994).
159. Id. 4.
160. Davis, supra note 20, at 148-49. For example, foreign governments and
international organizations have been particularly ready to work with U.S. states and
localities that are prepared to adopt aggressive environmental efforts to combat global
warming. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Cal., Gov.
Schwarzenegger, British Prime Minister Tony Blair Sign Historic Agreement to Collaborate
on Climate Change, Clean Energy (July 31, 2006), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php/press-release/2770/; see also Resnik et al., supra note 5, at 719.
[Vol. 77
